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"Indicia of ownership that are held primarily to protect a
security interest include legal or equitable title acquired
through or incident to foreclosure and its equivalents."22
The rule then pointed out that —
"The indicia of ownership held after foreclosure
continue to be maintained primarily as protection for a
security interest provided that the holder undertakes to
sell, re-lease the property...or otherwise divest itself of
the property in a reasonably expeditious manner...."23
Neither CERCLA nor the EPA rule require a
prospective mortgagee to conduct an environmental audit at
the site to qualify for the "lender exemption." Thus it is
clear that —
• A lender remains within the exemption during the term
of the security interest even though action is taken to police
the loan.
• The exemption can be maintained even in the event of
foreclosure provided the lender undertakes to sell or
otherwise divest itself of the property in a reasonably
expeditious manner using normal commercial means
provided the mortgagee did not participate in management
prior to the foreclosure.
• Following foreclosure, while the mortgagee is holding
the property for disposition, the lender may liquidate,
maintain business activities, wind up operations or perform
environmental clean-up operations.
EPA rule held invalid
In a major development in 1994, much to the surprise of
lenders, the EPA rule was invalidated in Kelley v. EPA.24
The U.S. Supreme Court refused to review the Kelley case
in January of 1995. The lending community responded with
renewed efforts to lobby for Congressional relief.25 The
lender liability provisions of that legislation would have
differed from the EPA rule in two major respects —
(1) lenders would be required to perform pre-loan due
diligence as a precondition to receiving favored treatment,
and (2) qualifying lenders would still be liable for the net
gains realized, if any, as a result of clean-up activities by
EPA. The legislation did not pass in 1994. Legislation has
been introduced in 1995 and is pending in the 104th
Congress.26 That legislation would adopt many of the
provisions in the EPA rule statutorily.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtors were livestock and
grain farmers who filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The
debtors had granted a pre-petition security interest to their
parents in farm machinery and livestock. The debtors
claimed exemptions in all farm equipment, livestock and
farm produce under Minn. Stat. § 550.37(5) and sought to
avoid the security interest in the machinery and livestock
under Section 522(f)(2)(B) as impairing the debtors’
exemption for those assets. The trustee objected to the
exemptions and avoidance of the security interest, arguing
that the trustee had the power to avoid the security interest
as unperfected; therefore, the debtors could not claim an
exemption for the property reclaimed by the trustee. The
court held that because the debtors sought avoidance first,
the trustee was barred from attempting to avoid the security
interest. The court held that Section 522(f)(2)(B) did not
apply to livestock or crops not used for the personal benefit
of the debtors; therefore, the security interest could not be
avoided as to those assets but could only be avoided as to
the debtors’ tools of the trade which included a long list of
assets from a tractor to livestock huts. In re Flitter, 181
B.R. 938 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995).
The debtors claimed an exemption in a residence which
was subject to a mortgage and a judicial lien in excess of the
fair market value of the property. The debtors sought to
avoid the judicial lien and the issue was whether the entire
lien was avoidable or whether the lien was avoidable only to
the extent of the debtors’ exemption amount. The case was
filed after the effective date of the 1994 amendment to
Section 522(f) and the court held that the amendment
codified the holding of In re Brantz, 106 B.R. 62 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1989) which held that the lien was avoidable only
to the extent the lien impaired the exemption. In re
Thomsen, 181 B.R. 1013 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1995).
    CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
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TRUSTEE FEE. The debtor’s Chapter 12 plan provided
for payment of the only three creditors, two governmental
units and the FmHA (now CFSA). The plan provided for
direct payments of the secured claims and payments of
unsecured claims from disposable income through the
trustee. The trustee objected to the direct payments. The
court held that, because the creditors were sophisticated
creditors, the debtor could make direct payments without
payment of the trustee fee. Matter of Cross, 182 B.R. 42
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1995).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
CLAIMS. The debtors had failed to make required
payments to fund two defined benefit pension plans. The
IRS filed a claim in the bankruptcy case for excise taxes,
under I.R.C. § 4971, for the failure of the debtors to
contribute the amounts to the benefit plans in 1989. After
the claims bar date, the IRS submitted amended claims
including additional penalties for 1989 and taxes and
penalties for failure to make payments in 1990. The IRS
sought priority status for the claims, administrative priority
for the claims and allowance of the amended claims. The
court held that the Section 4971 taxes were penalties and not
excise taxes and were not entitled to priority as taxes or
administrative expenses.  The IRS amended claims were not
allowed as untimely and as not sufficiently related to the
original claims.  In re CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc.,
53 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 1995), aff’g unrep. D. Ct. dec.
aff’g, 148 B.R. 332 (Bankr. D. Utah 1992).
DISCHARGE. The debtors’ income tax returns were
audited and additional taxes and civil fraud penalties were
assessed. After some negotiations, the debtor consented to
reduced amounts of taxes and penalties. The IRS argued in
the bankruptcy case that the debtors’ consent to the penalties
collaterally estopped the debtors from challenging the issue
that the taxes were nondischargeable for fraud. The court
held that the settlement agreement did not meet the
requirements for collateral estoppel because no adjudication
took place. In re Stodut, 181 B.R. 751 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y.
1995).
The debtor failed to timely file tax returns for 1979 and
1980. After an investigation was started by the IRS, the
debtor filed returns for those years but reported no tax
liability. The IRS audit assessed taxes for both years and
assessed a civil fraud penalty. The debtor made some
payments on the assessments until filing for Chapter 7
bankruptcy in 1993. The IRS filed a motion for summary
judgment, arguing that the assessment of the civil fraud
penalty made the taxes nondischargeable as a matter of law.
The court held that the mere assessment of civil fraud
penalties was insufficient alone to make the taxes
nondischargeable and denied the motion for summary
judgment. In re D’Alessio, 181 B.R. 756 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y.
1995).
The debtors timely filed their 1990 income tax return. In
October 1993, the debtors filed a Chapter 13 case which was
dismissed 169 days later. The IRS assessed the debtors for
additional 1990 taxes more than 240 days before the current
case was filed in May 1994, more than three years after the
1990 tax return was filed. The IRS argued that, under
Section 108(c) and I.R.C. § 6503(h), the first bankruptcy
case tolled the three year period of Sections 507(a)(7)(A)(i)
and 523(a)(7)(B) such that the taxes were not dischargeable
under those sections. The court held that the plain language
of Section 108(c) and I.R.C. § 6503(h) indicates that those
laws do not apply to bankruptcy provisions. The court noted
a significant split in the cases on this issue. In re Gore, 182
B.R. 293 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) . See also In re Turner,
182 B.R. 317 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) (same holding on
similar facts).
The debtors failed to file federal income tax returns for
eights years, although the debtors had filed for the previous
year and had income during the years no return was filed.
The court held that the taxes for those years were
nondischargeable for willful attempt to evade payment of
taxes. In re Bruner, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50356
(5th Cir. 1995).
DISMISSAL. The debtor had filed a previous Chapter 7
case in which a federal tax claim was held to be
nondischargeable because of the debtor’s willful failure to
pay taxes. The IRS had a tax lien on the debtor’s property
and had levied against the debtor’s only asset, monthly
social security payments. The debtor filed for Chapter 13
when the eligibility requirements were increased and the
IRS moved to dismiss the case and objected to the plan,
both on the grounds of bad faith. The IRS argued that,
because the tax debt was the only debt involved in the case
and because the debt was nondischargeable, the filing of the
Chapter 13 case was in bad faith. The court held that, under
its holding in In re Gathright, 67 B.R. 384 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1986), app. dismissed, 71 B.R. 343 (E.D. Pa. 1987), there is
no good faith filing requirement for Chapter 13 cases. The
court also held that only debtor misconduct or fraud in the
bankruptcy proceeding can give rise to bad faith sufficient
to deny confirmation of a plan or discharge in Chapter 13.
Because the debtor had accurately filed all schedules and
met all Chapter 13 requirements, confirmation could not be
denied for bad faith. In re Lilley, 181 B.R. 809 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1995).
PRIORITY. The debtor had filed a prior Chapter 11
case in which a plan was confirmed, but the debtor defaulted
on the plan payments and filed a second Chapter 11 case.
The IRS had filed a claim for taxes which had a priority
under Section 507(a)(7). The issue was whether the unpaid
portion of the tax claims was eligible for a priority in the
second case or was only general unsecured claims based on
the debtor’s default of the plan payments. The court held
that the tax claims retained their status as tax claims and
were eligible for priority status if the claims otherwise met
the priority requirements in the second case. In re Conston,
Inc., 181 B.R. 769 (D. Del. 1995).
TRUSTEE LIABILITY. The debtors filed for Chapter
11 and were appointed debtors-in-possession. The debtors
sold estate property by installment sale under approval of
the court. The debtors received the 1991 installment
payment while debtors-in-possession. In 1992, a liquidating
trustee was appointed and the trustee sought a ruling as to
whether the estate was liable for the tax on the gain
reportable from the first installment payment. The trustee
alleged that the debtors had misappropriated the payment
for their personal use. The court held that the trustee would
be liable for payment of the taxes if the debtors (1)
transferred the payment to the liquidating trustee, (2) used
the payment to pay creditors, (3) used the payment in the
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operation of the business, or (4) used the payment to pay
administrative expenses. The court found that the debtors
had filed inaccurate 1991 tax returns; therefore, the court
had insufficient evidence of the disposition of the payment
to make a ruling. The court deferred a ruling until the
debtors’ 1991 tax  returns were properly constructed by the
trustee. In re McRae, 181 B.R. 866 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1994).
CONTRACTS
BREACH. The plaintiff was a grain cooperative which
had hired the defendant to manage the facility to help the
cooperative make a profit. The defendant’s management did
achieve a profit for one year but the plaintiff soon after had
to liquidate. The plaintiff sued for breach of the
management contract under the theory of breach of an
implied warranty to perform in a workmanlike manner. The
defendant argued that the contract’s “hold harmless” clause
relieved it of any liability for any losses incurred during the
contract. The court held that such clauses are not enforced to
relieve contract parties of liability for their own negligence
unless the clause clearly expresses an intent to relieve
contract parties of liability for their own negligence. The
defendant argued that management services are similar to
professional services and cannot be subject to an implied
warranty of workmanlike performance. The court held that a
contract for management services implies that the
management services be performed in a workmanlike
manner.  Zenda Grain & Supply v. Farmland Indus., 894
P.2d 881 (Kan. App. 1995).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CROP INSURANCE-ALM § 13.04.*  The FCIC has
issued interim regulations under the Small Grains, Coarse
Grains, Cotton and Extra Long Staple Cotton crop
provisions of the Common Crop Insurance regulations to
allow insureds to collect both a guaranty deficiency
payment under the 50/92 and 0/92 provisions of the wheat,
feed grains, cotton and rice programs and a prevented
planting indemnity under the crop insurance program. 60
Fed. Reg. 35832 (July 12, 1995).
The FCIC has adopted as final regulations providing
additional sanctions, including fines and disqualification, for
willfully and intentionally providing false or inaccurate
information and for adoption of a material scheme or device
to obtain insurance benefits. 60 Fed. Reg. 37323 (July 20,
1995).
FARM PROGRAMS. The ASCS and CCC have
adopted as final regulations, under the feed grain, wheat,
cotton, rice and related programs, implementing the changes
made by the Agricultural Reconciliation Act of 1993 and to
implement the Options Pilot Program and the Voluntary
Production Limitation Program. 60 Fed. Reg. 33331 (June
28, 1994).
HERBICIDES. The plaintiffs were bean farmers who
purchased the herbicides Prowl and Scepter manufactured
by the defendant and applied the herbicides to their bean
crops. The plaintiffs claimed to have purchased the
herbicides based on advertisements made by the defendant
and did not look at or rely on the labels of the herbicides.
The plaintiff sued for breach of express and implied
warranties of merchantability because the herbicides did not
effectively control the weeds as claimed in the
advertisements. The defendant argued that the suit was
barred by pre-emption of FIFRA. The court held that the
action was not barred by FIFRA because the action did not
involve the labeling of the herbicides but only the
advertising and promotion of the products, areas not covered
by FIFRA. Malone v. American Cyanamid Co., 649
N.E.2d 493 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995).
PEANUTS. The CCC has issued interim regulations to
add the requirement that peanut producers comply with the
crop insurance regulations of 7 C.F.R. Part 400 in order to
qualify for the price support program. 60 Fed. Reg. 35834
(July 12, 1995).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT-ALM § 10.05[2].* The Secretary of Agriculture has
issued proposed regulations which provide for the
adjudication of the issue of whether a person is “responsibly
connected” with a commission merchant, dealer or broker in
the same disciplinary proceedings against the commission
merchant, dealer or broker. The proposed regulations also
provide that the adjudication be made by an Administrative
Law Judge. 60 Fed. Reg. 34474 (July 3, 1995).
SEEDS-ALM § 10.02.* The APHIS has adopted as final
regulations to include in the definition of noxious weed
seeds under the Federal Seed Act (FSA) all weeds listed in
the Federal Noxious Weed Act (FNWA). The regulations
are designed to overcome the prohibition of application of
the FNWA to imported shipments of seeds subject to the
FSA regulations. The problem was most recently
adjudicated in Pennington Seed, Inc. v. U.S., 10 F.3d 6
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (destruction of imported grass seed
containing serrated tussock seed improper because grass
seed governed by FSA which did not list serrated tussock
seed as noxious weed). 60 Fed. Reg. 35829 (July 12, 1995).
TUBERCULOSIS. The APHIS has issued an interim
regulation changing Kansas from a modified accredited state
to an accredited-free state. 60 Fed. Reg. 33100 (June 27,
1995).
WEEDS. The APHIS has adopted as final amendments
to the noxious weed regulations to remove Stratiotes aloides
Linnaeus (water aloe) and Euphorbia prunifolia Jacquin
(painted euphobia) from the list of noxious weeds and to
add Ottelia alismoides (L.) Pers and Solanum viarum Dunal
(tropical soda apple) to the list. 60 Fed. Reg. 35831 (July
12, 1995).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
ADMINISTRATION EXPENSES. The decedent’s
estate included a 150 acre residential property which was
included in a marital trust for the decedent and over which
the decedent had a general power of appointment.  If the
decedent did not appoint the property to someone, the
property passed to a residuary trust established by the
decedent’s predeceased spouse. The decedent did not
appoint the property; however, the estate held the property
until other assets were sold and until after the federal estate
tax return was filed. The estate tax return included a
deduction for the anticipated costs of maintaining and
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selling the property. The court held that the costs were not
deductible because the estate gave no sufficient reason for
holding the property so long and not transferring the
property itself to the residuary trust where the costs would
be chargeable to the trust. Est. of Millikin v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1995-288.
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The decedent’s will
provided for the estate property to pass to an inter vivos
trust for the care and maintenance of the decedent’s pet cats
and dogs, with the remainder to pass to charitable
organizations. The trustees split the trust into a trust with
sufficient property to provide for the animals and a second
trust with charitable organizations as the only beneficiaries.
At the death of the last animal, the remainder of the first
trust passed to the charitable trust. The IRS ruled that the
second trust was eligible for the charitable deduction but
that the first trust was not. Ltr. Rul. 9526027, April 5,
1995.
DISCLAIMERS-ALM § 5.02[6].* The decedent’s will
bequeathed the residuary estate to a trust for the decedent’s
two children. The trust was to be divided into two portions
with one portion to equal the decedent’s generation skipping
transfer tax exemption amount. One child disclaimed a
testamentary power over the GSTT trust property, a power
to change the GSTT trust trustee and the power to serve as
trustee of the GSTT trust. The IRS ruled that the disclaimer
was effective. Ltr. Rul. 9526019, March 31, 1995.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* The taxpayer established three charitable lead
annuity trusts prior to 1984 with the taxpayer’s issue as
remainder holders who would receive interests in trust in the
trusts’ property. Two of the trusts had terminated as to the
charitable annuity interests and the third trust was about to
terminate. The taxpayer and remainder holders merged the
three trusts, retaining the separate provisions of the trusts to
the extent that the trusts provided different rights for the
remainder beneficiaries. The IRS ruled that the merger
would not subject the trusts to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9525057,
March 28, 1995.
Seven trust were originally established from 1963
through 1969, each with three of the grantor’s children as
remainder holders and a charitable organization as income
beneficiary. The trusts obtained a state court order to divide
the trusts into three trusts, one for each child. The IRS ruled
that the division would not subject the trusts to GSTT. Ltr.
Rul. 9524026, March 22, 1995.
The decedent’s will established three trusts in 1962, one
for the surviving spouse and one for each of the couple’s
two children and their spouse’s and issue. The spouse had
died and the trustee discovered that the trust contained no
provision for distribution or cumulation of trust income
between the time the spouse died and the termination of the
spouse’s trust. The trustee applied for a state court
construction of the will to determine the disposition of trust
income for the spousal trust. The IRS ruled that the state
court construction would not subject the trusts to GSTT.
Ltr. Rul. 9524027, March 22, 1995.
LIFE INSURANCE. The decedent had owned a
Federal Employees Group Life Insurance policy and had
made an irrevocable assignment all ownership of the policy.
the court held that the proceeds of the policy were includible
in the decedent’s gross estate because the policy and law
prohibited the irrevocable assignment of the right to
designate a beneficiary; thus, leaving the decedent with a
possibility of regaining an aspect of ownership. Hays v.
Comm’r, 95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,203 (S.D. Ill.
1995).
SPECIAL USE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].* The
decedent’s will bequeathed ranch property to several
qualified heirs. On the estate’s federal estate tax return, the
box for the special use valuation election was checked and
much of the filing requirements for the election were met
with the exception of (1) the recapture agreement; (2) the
information supporting the special use values claimed; (3)
the name, address, taxpayer identification number and
relationship to the decedent of all persons having an interest
in the property; (4) written appraisals of the property; (5) the
value of the property received by each heir; and (6)
affidavits concerning material participation by heirs. The
return also failed to include the signature of all heirs on the
Notice of Election. The IRS notified the estate of the
missing requirements and the estate supplied the missing
elements within 90 days; however, the IRS denied the
special use valuation election because the initial election did
not substantially meet the requirements. The Tax Court held
that the election did substantially meet the requirements for
the election. The appellate court reversed. The court focused
on the lack of the recapture agreement and held that no
special use election substantially complies with the election
requirements if it does not include a recapture agreement;
therefore, the estate’s special use valuation election could
not be perfected. Est. of Hudgins v. Comm’r, 95-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,202 (5th Cir. 1995).
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS-
ALM § 5.02[3].*  The decedent had reached a property
settlement agreement with the decedent’s former spouse
which created a trust for the decedent with the remainder
passing to the former spouse in trust. The property
settlement was included in the divorce decree. The IRS
ruled that because the former spouse had no marital rights in
the property transferred to the trust, the decedent did not
receive any consideration for the property transferred to the
trust and the property was included in the decedent’s gross
estate. The IRS also ruled that, because the decedent was
deemed to have received consideration for the transfer to a
spouse under I.R.C. § 2043(b)(2), the decedent’s estate
could deduct the value of the interests in trust transferred to
the former spouse. Ltr. Rul. 9527007, March 22, 1995.
VALUATION. The taxpayer established two trusts,
identical except that one trust was for four years and the
other for seven years. The trusts were funded with S
corporation stock. The trusts provided for an annuity of an
increasing percentage of the value of the trust to be paid first
from trust income and second from trust principal, with any
excess income to be accumulated in principal. If the
taxpayer died before the termination of the trusts, the trusts’
property passed as appointed by the taxpayer or to the
taxpayer’s estate; otherwise, the property passed to named
individuals. The IRS ruled that the taxpayer was considered
the owner of the trusts and that the trusts were QSSTs. The
IRS also ruled that the taxpayer’s annuity interests were
qualified annuity interests and the value of the gifts to the
remainder holders was the fair market value of the assets
transferred to the trusts less the value of the annuity interests
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retained by the taxpayer. Ltr. Rul. 9525032, March 22,
1995.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BUSINESS EXPENSES. The taxpayer was a business
manager and shareholder in an S corporation which
operated a car dealership. The taxpayer entered into an
agreement with the corporation to pay bonuses to the
corporation for any losses incurred by the corporation. The
purpose of the agreement was to provide an incentive for the
taxpayer to effectively manage the corporation’s business.
The court held that the payments were deductible as an
ordinary and necessary business expense incurred to protect
the business. DeLorean v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1995-
287.
C CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02.*
CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS. The taxpayers,
husband and wife, were the sole shareholders in a
corporation. The taxpayers made withdrawals from the
corporation in several years and treated the withdrawals as
loans for federal income tax purposes. During the years
involved, the corporation declared few if any dividends even
though the corporation had substantial earnings and profits.
The corporation did not pass a resolution authorizing the
loans, the loans had no note or other agreement for
repayment and the taxpayers provided no security for the
loans. The court held that the loans were taxable as
constructive dividends. Epps v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1995-297.
COOPERATIVES-ALM § 14.03.* The taxpayer was a
taxable farmers’ cooperative which issued annual dividends
in part by qualified written notices of allocation of the
cooperative’s taxable profit. The cooperative’s patrons
included the amounts in the notices in their taxable income.
When a patron terminated a membership, the cooperative
redeemed the notices held by the patron at a discounted
amount. The IRS argued that, under the tax benefit rule, the
difference between the face value of the notices and the
amounts actually paid to terminated patrons was taxable
income to the cooperative. The court acknowledged that the
cooperative tax laws were based on a “one level” taxation,
either at the cooperative level or at the patron level and that
the patrons were deemed to have constructively received the
amounts in the written notices of allocation. However, the
court agreed with the IRS that the discounting of the
redemption amount carried back that amount to increase the
original taxable income; therefore, the tax benefit rule
applied to include the discounted amount in the
cooperative's taxable income. Gold Kist, Inc. v. Comm’r,
104 T.C. No. 34 (1995).
DEDUCTIONS. The IRS has adopted as final
regulations eliminating the rule that required an employer to
deduct and withhold income tax as a prerequisite for
claiming a deduction for property transferred to an
employee in connection with the performance of services.
The proposed regulations provide guidance for
substantiating a deduction for transfers of property for
services. 60 Fed. Reg. 36995 (July 19, 1995).
DEPLETION-ALM § 4.03[5].*  The taxpayer was a
corporation which owned timber in Oregon and California.
The taxpayer combined the timber tracts into one unit for
purposes of claiming depletion, although 94 percent of the
harvested timber came from the Oregon land. The IRS
denied much of the deduction because the IRS separated the
land into two tracts and calculated depletion separately for
each tract. The IRS argued that its decision was not
judicially reviewable because the decision was an
interpretation of the regulations. The court held that the
application of a regulation to the taxpayer’s case was a
judicial function performed by the IRS and was subject to
judicial review. The IRS also argued that Treas. Reg. §
1.611-3(d)(5) empowered the IRS to readjust depletion
allowances. The court held that the regulation was invalid
because it exceeded the IRS authority to promulgate
regulations since the regulation gave the IRS a judicial
authority. RLC Industries Co. v. Comm’r, 95-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,328 (9th Cir. 1995), aff’g, 98 T.C. 457
(1993).
DUES DEDUCTION. The IRS has adopted as final
regulations disallowing the dues deduction for dues paid to
luncheon clubs, airline and hotel clubs and any organization
which has the principal purpose of conducting entertainment
activities or gaining access for the members to
entertainment facilities. The regulations would allow the
deduction for service club dues. The regulations reflect the
changes made by OBRA 1993. 60 Fed. Reg. 36993 (July
19, 1995), amending Treas. Reg. § 1.274-2.
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayers were not allowed
investment tax credit, depreciation or other expenses
exceeding the income from a cattle farm because they did
not operate the business with the intent to make a profit
since the taxpayers did not have sufficient experience, did
not consult with experts, did not keep adequate records and
did not spend much time at the business. Appellate decision
designated as not for publication. Lombard v. Comm’r,
95-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,350 (4th Cir. 1995), aff’g,
T.C. Memo. 1994-154.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES-ALM § 4.02[16].* The
taxpayers owned timber land and entered into a contract
with a corporation which allowed the corporation to cut all
trees on the property during the two year length of the
contract. The corporation transferred three tracts of timber
land to the taxpayers in exchange for the trees cut. The
corporation finished cutting all the trees about 75 days after
entering into the agreement. The IRS cited two cases with
similar facts but different conclusions. In Commissioner v.
Crichton, 122 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1941), aff’g, 42 B.T.A. 490
(1940) like-kind exchange treatment was allowed for the
exchange of a royalty interest in a mineral estate for a city
lot. In Fleming v. Comm’r, 24 T.C. 818 (1955), aff’d 356
U.S. 260 (1958) like-kind exchange treatment was not
allowed for an assignment of some oil payment rights in
exchange for a fee interest in real estate. The IRS cited Koch
v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 54 (1978) for the explanation that the
difference between the holdings was that the royalty interest
continued until the mineral was exhausted and the oil
payment right could terminate before the mineral was
exhausted. In the current case, the IRS ruled that like-kind
exchange treatment (nonrecognition of gain and loss) was
not allowed because the corporation was allowed only two
years to cut the trees, allowing the possibility that not all
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trees would be cut. The IRS characterized the exchange as
trees for land. The IRS did not discuss the fact that all the
trees were actually cut within the two year period, implying
that the availability of like-kind exchange treatment depends
on the language of the agreement and not the actual conduct
of the parties. Ltr. Rul. 9525002, Feb. 23, 1995.
The taxpayer, a trust, owned an undivided interest in
several parcels in one tract of land with several other
persons. All owners agreed to an exchange of interests so
that each co-owner would receive a complete fee interest in
a portion of the land equal to the value of the original
undivided interest in the whole parcel. The exchange was
made through a qualified intermediary who received title to
the property and then simultaneously reconveyed title to
each portion to each person. The taxpayer held the property
for investment before and after the exchange and all
property was of like-kind. The IRS ruled that the exchange
qualified for nonrecognition of gain. The IRS cautioned that
because the other owners were related to the taxpayer,
I.R.C. § 1031(f) could cause recognition of gain from the
exchange if the property is sold by the taxpayer or a related
party within two years after the exchange. Ltr. Rul.
9525038, March 22, 1995; Ltr. Rul. 9525039, March 22,
1995.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
INADVERTENT TERMINATION. A shareholder of an
S corporation died leaving shares of the corporation’s stock
to two trusts which were QSSTs. However, neither trust
filed an election to be treated as a QSST and the corporation
did not distribute the trusts’ share of income to the trusts but
paid the funds to the IRS as estimated taxes for the benefit
of the trusts’ beneficiaries. When the errors were
discovered, the trusts’ beneficiaries requested permission to
file the elections retroactively and to amend their personal
tax returns to show the additional corporation income which
should have passed to the trusts. The IRS ruled that the
termination was inadvertent and that the corporation could
continue to be taxed as an S corporation if the beneficiaries
filed a proper QSST election and amended their tax returns.
Ltr. Rul. 9527018, April 6, 1995.
SHAREHOLDER’S INTEREST. The IRS has issued
proposed regulations governing the determination of a
shareholder’s pro rata share of S corporation items of
income, loss, deduction and credit. Under the proposed
regulations, each shareholder’s pro rata share of an item is
determined by assigning an equal portion of each item to
each day of the corporation’s taxable year, unless an
election is made to terminate the taxable year because of
termination of a shareholder’s interest. Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.1377-1(a)(1). For this purpose, an S corporation's taxable
year does not include any day in which the corporation did
not have any shareholders. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1377-
1(a)(2)(i). If a shareholder transfers all stock or dies, the
shareholder is treated as a shareholder on the day of the
transfer or death. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1377-1(a)(2)(ii).
If a shareholder’s entire interest in the corporation is
terminated, the remaining shareholders can unanimously
elect to apply the above rules as if the corporation tax year
was split into two taxable years. Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.1377-1(b). A terminated shareholder’s interest in the
corporation as an  owner of an option to purchase stock,
creditor, employee, director or other non-shareholder
capacity is disregarded. The election does not otherwise
affect the S corporation’s taxable year or filing date.
The election takes precedence over the election provided
by Treas. Reg. § 1.1368-1(g)(2) but is not allowed if the S
corporation election is terminated. Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.1377-1(b).
The proposed regulations also defines “post-termination
transition period” as (1) the period beginning on the day
after the last day of the taxable year as an S corporation and
ending on the later of one year later or the due date of the
return for the last taxable year and (2) 120 days after a
determination that the S corporation election had
terminated. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1377-2. 60 Fed. Reg.
35882 (July 12, 1995).
SALE OF RESIDENCE. The taxpayer sold a residence
and purchased a new residence when the taxpayer was over
55 years old. The taxpayer’s tax return preparer made the
I.R.C. § 121 election to exclude the gain from the sale of the
residence. Several years later, the taxpayer sold the second
residence and purchased a third and claimed the Section 121
election again. The IRS denied the second election because
only one Section 121 election is allowed each taxpayer. The
taxpayer argued that the first election was an error and
sought revocation of the election on the grounds the sale and
reinvestment provisions of I.R.C. § 1034 were mandatory
and would have covered the gain involved. The court held
that the election could not be revoked more than three years
after it was made and could not be revoked because of
reliance on the tax return preparer. Appellate decision
designated as not for publication.  Robarts v. Comm’r, 95-
2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50351 (11th Cir. 1995), aff’g,
103 T.C. 72 (1994).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
AGISTER’S LIEN. The plaintiff had successfully
defended against an action by a secured creditor for a
deficiency on a loan after the sale of the collateral livestock.
The deficiency was barred by the failure of the creditor to
give to the plaintiff proper notice of the sale of the
collateral. The plaintiff brought the present action to recover
the costs of caring for the livestock during the previous
action, arguing that the plaintiff had a statutory agister’s lien
for the costs of caring for the livestock. The court held that
the remedy of barring any deficiency was sufficient
compensation to the plaintiff for the misconduct of the
creditor and that to provide an additional award would
amount to a double recovery. The court also refused to
extend the agister’s lien law to allow the owner of livestock
to attach a lien for the costs of caring for that livestock.
Coones v. F.D.I.C., 894 P.2d 613 (Wyo. 1995). See also
Coones v. F.D.I.C., 848 P.2d 783 (Wyo. 1993).
CITATION UPDATES
International Paper Co v. U.S., 33 Fed. Cl. 384 (1995)
(interest) see p. 93 supra.
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STATE REGULATION OF
AGRICULTURE
WAREHOUSES. The defendants were an
employee of a Colorado grain storage corporation, the
Colorado corporation and a California corporation which
owned 90 percent of the Colorado corporation. The
plaintiffs were bean producers who had stored beans with
the Colorado corporation. The plaintiffs accused the
defendant of negligence, fraud, and violation of the
Colorado Farm Products Act, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 12-16-101
et seq. for the sale of the plaintiffs’ beans without
permission and the covering up of the transaction with
sham trades between the corporations.  The California
corporation denied any liability for the actions of the
Colorado corporation’s employee. The court held that the
employee was acting as an agent of the Colorado
corporation because the employee’s actions were within the
scope of employment and the employee personally arranged
the transactions which gave rise to the fraudulent sales. The
California corporation also argued that it was not liable for
the actions of the Colorado corporation under the alter ego
doctrine. The court held that because the Colorado
corporation was formed by the California corporation and
90 percent financed and controlled by the California
corporation, the California corporation was liable for the
actions of the Colorado corporation and its agents. The
defendants also argued that the Farm Products Act did not
provide a private right of action to enforce the Act. The
court held that the Act did provide a private right of action
if the offended producer first obtained the prior written
consent of the Commissioner of Agriculture, which the
plaintiffs did. Gorsich v. Double B Trading Co., Inc., 893
P.2d 1357 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
SEEDS. The plaintiff was a corporation which
purchased cantaloupe seeds from the defendants. The
plaintiff sent the seeds to a grower in Panama who grew the
seeds under a contract with the plaintiff. The plaintiff
claimed that the seeds were defective and sued the
defendants for breach of express and implied warranties of
merchantability and for breach of implied warranty for a
particular purpose. The defendant argued that the action
was barred by Fla. Stat. § 578.26 which required a “farmer”
to first bring an administrative action with the Florida Seed
Investigation and Conciliation Council for resolution before
bringing any court action. The plaintiff argued that it was
not a “farmer” under the act because it did not grow the
seeds. The court held that the plaintiff was a farmer and was
barred from the action for failure to first bring an
administrative action. The court found that the plaintiff
produced the melons through the contract with the Panama
grower for sale by the plaintiff. Interlatin Supply v. S &
M Farm Supply, Inc., 654 So.2d 254 (Fla. Ct. App.
1995).
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